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ABSTRACT
eHealth devices such as smart scales and wearable fitness track-
ers are a key part of many health technology solutions. How-
ever, these eHealth devices can be vulnerable to privacy and se-
curity related attacks. In this poster, we propose a security anal-
ysis framework for eHealth devices, called mH-PriSe, that will
yield useful information for security analysts, vendors, health care
providers, and consumers. We demonstrate our framework by
analysing scales from 6 vendors. Our results show that while ven-
dors strive to address security and privacy issues correctly, chal-
lenges remain in many cases. Only 5 out of 8 solutions can be
recommended with some caveats whereas the remaining 3 solu-
tions expose severe vulnerabilities.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Guaranteed security standards and unrestricted privacy pro-
tection are indispensable for data that are provided by fitness
and health devices, such as smart scales and wearable trackers.
While most consumer devices are mainly used by individuals for
tracking their own health, data can be used in consultations with
health care professionals or as evidence in courtrooms [19]. Con-
sumer devices typically do not adhere to strict medical device
standards [2] and may exhibit vulnerabilities not found in sys-
tems that are subject to privacy standards such as HIPAA [12, 10].
With mH-PriSe we propose a framework for the analysis of pri-
vacy and security aspects of eHealth solutions. We include static
analysis, dynamic analysis and penetration testing functionality.
With the various potential applications in mind we design this
framework to be scalable and adjustable to the needs of security
analysts. We validate this framework by investigating 8 different
smart scales from 6 vendors. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to provide a comparative analysis of privacy and security
vulnerabilities of smart scales.
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2. SMART SCALES IN EHEALTH
Here, we use eHealth loosely to describe practices designed
to promote a person’s health and well-being through technol-
ogy. The kind of eHealth solutions we are interested in typically
involve a sensor device (scale, activity tracker, blood oximeter
etc.), a mobile application that is installed as a companion on
the user’s phone and a vendor-supplied web offering (c.f. Fig-
ure 1). Commonly other third party services (data analysis, ad-
vertising, social media) can be connected. The protocols em-
ployed are mostly standard, such as Bluetooth LE or Wifi for the
device radios, and use HTTP(S) for data transfer. Since most solu-
tions only support Android and iOS as mobile operating systems,
we focus on those ecosystems here, and the static analysis part of
the framework will be limited to Android only.
The study at hand focusses on Smart Scales as sensor devices.
With Withings launching its first scale in 2012 the market by now
has become very diverse. In a range from simple to advanced
solutions these scales collect information on weight, Body Mass
Index and body fat to water percentage, muscle mass and bone
mass. The common idea is to track one’s weight and further data
on a daily basis to provide insights into health and well-being.
WiFi enabled sensor device
Bluetooth enabled sensor device
Figure 1: eHealth logical architecture
3. mH-PriSe ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
Our analysis framework, mH-PriSe, and experiment setup al-
lows for sound and methodological scientific research (c.f. Fig-
ure 2). We ran our experiments on a Lenovo X230 laptop with
Kali Linux 2.0 and used an Atheros external WiFi card to create a
hotspot. The test device was a rooted LG Nexus 5 with Android
6.0 installed. Test results were stored in a MySQL database and
viewed through phpMyAdmin.
We have defined a threat model which includes assets, agents,
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Figure 2: mHealth security and privacy analysis framework
weaknesses and attack vectors (full details in [16]). The mH-PriSe
framework builds on this threat model and is defined by test cases
(following attack vectors) and test steps (weaknesses) assigned to
them. The view is complemented through the recording of in-
formational steps. We investigated the actual behaviour of each
solution in four steps. Preparatory functionality, which is sum-
marized under the first step, is omitted here:
static analysis In 7 steps, we apply static analysis to develop-
ment artefacts. Among others research tools used include
Androguard with Mallordoid,Drozer, and Android SDK tools.
dynamic analysis Running 5 test cases and 44 test steps in total,
we check for known weaknesses and search for issues. For
this purpose MITMproxy is used to forge certificates and
intercept any traffic on our hotspot.
post analysis Data collected through experimentation undergoes
a rigorous, manual analysis. SSLLabs was used to analyze
web server security. We also visualize the communication
on a world map.
Subsequently the actual behaviour was compared to information
retrieved from documented sources such as privacy policies and
websites. Privacy policies are analysed according to their com-
pliance with OECD guidelines [9] and EU regulations [7, 6].
4. RESULTS AND EVALUATION
We report our results under 8 main properties (rows) with a
fail caused by major issues, warnings due to some issues and a
pass based on some caveats (see Table 1). The first two rows of
the table include findings related to data transmission between
app and server or sensor and server. Weaknesses that have been
identified in this context are highly severe. For example solu-
tions Activ8rlives, HAPI, Thomson and iChoice failed to correctly
use cryptography in their apps, including cases of missing traf-
fic encryption, badly implemented SSL, un-salted passwords and
re-constructable message authentication codes. The scales WS-
30 and WS-50 by Withings as well as Aria by Fitbit connect di-
rectly to the internet and fail to make use of SSL encryption. The
newer Body Cardio by Withings is the only scale in our test set
that employs traffic encryption. These weaknesses allow for ses-
sions stealing, traffic injection and tampering with measurements
as indicated in Table 1.
The Fitbit Aria protocol, for example, is in version 39. After pre-
vious research had revealed issues, fixes have been applied [8,
18]. Our findings show that the protocol is still vulnerable to re-
computing the MAC. What is even worse – if no precautions are
taken – is that the scale reveals WiFi credentials during the pair-
ing with a users home WiFi network.
The Thomson TBS705 scale and their mobile application show
serious privacy weaknesses. Sending device tracking data to a
Chinese advertising server and transferring unencrypted mea-
surement data to a Europe server while offering no control over
the data or providing a privacy policy, the solution violates many
privacy principles found in the OECD guidelines.
While no solution looked intentionally malicious, many require
updates to their mobile applications or sensor firmwares. Though
solutions Withings Body Cardio and iChoice with SwissMed app
are of commendable security standard, the latter performs slightly
better with respect to privacy aspects. For the privacy we refer to
the amount of data synchronised to different destinations and
also aspects mentioned in privacy policies as compared to their
actual behaviour.
Through our rigorous analysis we have identified the following
main issues with smart scale solutions.
ISS 1 missing or broken encryption – over the (wireless)
network including app-to-server and sensor-to-
server communication
ISS 2 improper certificate validation – trust manager
issues or invalid certificate
ISS 3 missing tampering protection – traffic and mes-
sages are not protected against tampering
ISS 4 personal data leaked – unnoticed data leakage;
requires patches by vendors, mainly, to adhere to
common practices in implementation
ISS 5 improper cryptography usage – inadequate usage
of cryptographic functions such as missing salts
for hashes or MAC failures
ISS 6 weak password policies – missing or weak pass-
word policies
ISS 7 account deletion – flawed account deactivation
or deletion processes
ISS 8 overprivileged application – overprivileged appli-
cations installed on device
5. RELATEDWORK
This study extends the previous work of Knorr et. al. [14, 15] to
include sensor devices. Mense et al. provide more detail on the
behaviour of mHealth applications with respect to privacy and
the data being transmitted [17]. Baig et al. recently explored the
research area of mHealth applications by reviewing their system
design and the identified challenges and issues. Among those the
biggest are security, privacy and safety [1].
Other researchers investigated single solutions more comprehen-
sively to find similar security and privacy issues in many [5, 11].
Privacy and security issues in update mechanisms of sensor soft-
ware and with mobile apps are detected in the work of Cyr et al.
Various kinds of attacks on fitness devices have become popular
in research (representative list): Over-the-air-attacks on fitness
and health devices showing similar issues [11, 3] or reverse en-
gineering of firmware and protocols [20, 4]. The closest work is
Clausing et al. and Hilts et al. on a set of different activity track-
ers [13, 3].
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app to server 7 trust issues; traffic
tampering
3 standard SSL 7 no SSL; poor crypto
usage
7 trust
issues;
3 strong
SSL
7 no SSL; poor crypto
usage
3 standard SSL
sensor to server N/A 7 no SSL; protocol
reversed
N/A N/A N/A 7 no SSL 3 SSL
app & mobile
device
7 data leakage; no
password policy;
overprivileged
B modern analytics
library
7 no encryption; broken
crypto for passwords; no
data wipe; highly
overpriviledged
B pwd chang policy and data
wipe
7 overpriviledged;data
leakage; logging leakage;
leaks credentials; no data
wipe
B modern analytics; no pass-
word change policy; reasonably
priviledged
sensor security B no strict BT pairing; no
firmware update process
7 leaks wifi credentials;
unencrypted traffic;
protocol reversed
B no strict BT pairing; no
firmware update process
B no strict BT pairing; no
firmware update process
B no strict BT pairing; no
firmware update process
7 leaks
session; no
SSL
3 safe
pairing with
SSL
web server
7 broken account
deletion process; weak
password policy;
vulnerable SSL config
3 no password change
policy; fine grained privacy
settings
B input not validated; no
wipe option; password
(change) polciy can be
improved
3 weak
pwd policy;
good privacy
B same
but SSL
dated;
undetermined
not available
3 no password change policy;
password policy can be improved
data leakage
7 data leaked;
overprivileged app puts
risk on updates
B analytics data
tracking; wlan ssid send
B analytics tracking 3 minimal data exchange and
no leakage
7 no data control; leaks
device identifier
B approx. location shared with
vendor; modern analytics
data storage UK United States Canada United States Europe Europe
according to
privacy policy
3Europe 3United States,
Safe-Harbor
7none mentioned 3United States 7no policy available 3Europe
Table 1: Security and privacy analysis results. Fail: major problems. Warn: some problems. Pass: with caveats
6. CONCLUSION
Our results show clear security and privacy problems in popu-
lar smart scale solutions. Vendors should be encouraged to meet
security standards as defined for example by OWASP, CERT or
others even for devices that are targeted at consumers. Flawed
pairing processes and insecure software development lead to vul-
nerable solutions allowing attackers to easily eavesdrop on com-
munication. In future work, we plan to create summaries of our
findings that can be used by consumers and health care providers
to take informed decisions when buying products or using data
provided by products. We also plan to reach out to manufactur-
ers to discuss our findings.
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